Seventh Circuit Review
Volume 2

Issue 1

Article 14

9-1-2006

Semper Fi? The Infidelity of the Seventh Circuit in Applying a Good
Moral Character Requirement to Naturalizing War Veterans
Joshua P. Montgomery
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Joshua P. Montgomery, Semper Fi? The Infidelity of the Seventh Circuit in Applying a Good Moral
Character Requirement to Naturalizing War Veterans, 2 Seventh Circuit Rev. 380 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol2/iss1/14

This Immigration is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

Montgomery: Semper Fi? The Infidelity of the Seventh Circuit in Applying a Go

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 2, Issue 1

Fall 2006

SEMPER FI?1 THE INFIDELITY OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT IN APPLYING A GOOD MORAL
CHARACTER REQUIREMENT TO NATURALIZING
WAR VETERANS
JOSHUA P. MONTGOMERY∗
Cite as: Joshua P. Montgomery, Semper Fi? The Infidelity of the Seventh Circuit in
Applying a Good Moral Character Requirement to Naturalizing War Veterans, 2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 380 (2006), at http://www.kentlaw.edu/7cr/v21/montgomery.pdf.

INTRODUCTION
O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
presented the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit with a
question of first impression.2 That is, whether “aliens who served
honorably in the U.S. military in times of war [must make] a showing
of good character when applying to become naturalized citizens.”3
Unfortunately for these veterans, the Seventh Circuit incorrectly
interpreted the plain language of the naturalization statutes and held
that such aliens must show good moral character before becoming
citizens.4 Particularly troubling is the reasoning by which the court
1

Semper Fi is the motto of the Marine Corps and is short for the Latin phrase
simper fidelis, which means “always faithful.” http://hqinet001.hqmc.usmc.mil/HD/
Historical/Customes_Traditions/Marine%20Corps_Motto.htm.
∗ J.D. candidate and Certificate in Litigation and Alternative Dispute
Resolution candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A. Political Science, 2001, University of Arizona. I am deeply
indebted to my wife, Stephanie, for all of her support and encouragement throughout
my time in law school.
2
453 F.3d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 2006).
3
Id. at 812.
4
Id. at 816.
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reached its conclusion.5 In order to provide aliens with this additional
hurdle in the naturalization process, the court misquoted a key statute
and employed a logic riddled with contradiction.6
Specifically, this Note will contend that the Seventh Circuit erred
in O’Sullivan when it held that the standard naturalization requirement
that aliens prove “good moral character”7 also applies to aliens seeking
to naturalize through statutory exceptions extended to wartime
veterans.8 The court should have held that, based on a plain reading of
these statutes, a showing of good moral character is not required for
wartime veterans to naturalize. Section one of this Note will explain
the interaction of the naturalization statutes at issue in O’Sullivan.
Section two will explain why the court correctly declined to defer to
Citizenship and Immigration Services to interpret these statutes.
Section three will describe the background and procedural history of
O’Sullivan. Section four will explain the case law cited by the Seventh
Circuit in the O’Sullivan decision. Finally, section five will identify
errors in the court’s analysis.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IMMIGRATION STATUTES APPLICABLE TO
ALIEN WAR VETERANS SEEKING TO NATURALIZE

Justice Scalia once noted that “administrative law is not for
sissies.”9 This is particularly true when attempting to elucidate
consistent meanings from immigration and naturalization statutes,
which have been described as a “labyrinthine . . . maze of hypertechnical statutes and regulations that engender . . . confusion for the

5

See id. at 815-16.
Id. at 815 (misquoting 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) by replacing the word “referred”
with the word “mentioned”).
7
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
8
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)(1)-(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
9
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 Duke L.J. 511, 511 (Administrative Law Lecture, delivered at Duke University
School of Law, January 24, 1989).
6
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Government and petitioners alike.”10 The problem presented in
O’Sullivan is particularly difficult: “whether [§] 1440 excuses aliens
who served honorably in the U.S. military in times of war from
making a showing of good moral character when applying to become
naturalized citizens.”11 The difficulty in answering this question stems
from the extensive interplay between 8 U.S.C.S. §§ 1427, 1439, and
1440.12 To limit confusion in this Note, the plain language of these
statutes is provided in pertinent part below, along with a brief
overview of how they interact.
A. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427 details the fundamental residency requirements
necessary to become a naturalized citizen of the United States,13 such
as the requisite length of time one must be physically present in this
country and the different types of absences that are permitted during
this period.14 This statute also includes the good moral character
component at issue in O’Sullivan.15 Specifically, in relevant part,
§ 1427 states:
(a) Residence. No person, except as otherwise provided
in this title, shall be naturalized unless such
applicant . . . (3) during all the periods referred to in
10

Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *1, n.1, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No.
05-2943, (7th Cir. October 28, 2005) (citing Drax v. Reno, 338 F.3d 98, 99 (2d Cir.
2003)), 2005 WL 3738527.
11
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812.
12
Boatswain v. Ashcroft, 267 F. Supp. 2d 377, 379 (D.N.Y. 2003) (observing
that “[w]ading through the statutory scheme is not a simple task because . . . the
immigration laws are a patchwork, containing numerous inconsistencies and
vagaries.”) (internal cites omitted).
13
O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Serv., 372 F. Supp.
2d 1097, 1100 (D. Ill. 2005) aff’d, 453 F.3d 809, (stating that “[s]ection 1427(a) sets
forth the general requirements for naturalization”).
14
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)-(c) (LexisNexis 2006).
15
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3); O’Sullivan. 453 F.3d at 812-13.
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this subsection has been and still is a person of good
moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the United States.16
The confusion in O’Sullivan “stems from the good character
requirement’s placement in the naturalization statute” as a subset of
the broader residency requirement.17 The reason this placement is
problematic is because the residency requirements of § 1427(a) are not
applicable to naturalizing aliens who served in the armed forces during
times of war.18 Thus, the question in O’Sullivan is whether the good
moral character requirement in § 1427(a)(3), is waived when the
broader residency requirements to which it is attached, § 1427(a), are
waived.19
B. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e)
In its conclusion that alien wartime veterans are required to make
a showing of good moral character, the court relied, in part, on 8
U.S.C.S. § 1427(e).20 This section of the naturalization statute allows
the Attorney General, when considering an applicant’s moral
character, to consider conduct occurring prior to the five year period21
16

8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (emphasis added).
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812.
18
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that a “person filing an
application under subsection . . . shall comply in all other respects with the
requirements of this title, except that . . . no period of residence or specified period
of physical presence within the United States or any State or district of the Service in
the United States shall be required”).
19
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 813.
20
Id. at 815.
21
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(1) (stating “immediately preceding the date of filing
his application for naturalization has resided continuously, after being lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for at least five years and
during the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his application has
been physically present therein for periods totaling at least half of that time and who
17
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preceding the filing of a naturalization application.22 Specifically,
§ 1427(e) states:
(e) Determination. In determining whether the applicant
has sustained the burden of establishing good moral
character and the other qualifications for citizenship
specified in subsection (a) of this section, the Attorney
General shall not be limited to the applicant’s conduct
during the five years preceding the filing of the petition,
but may take into consideration as a basis for such
determination the applicant’s conduct and acts at any
time prior to that period.23
The O’Sullivan court found it particularly persuasive that this
section of § 1427 distinguished between “good moral character” and
“other qualifications for citizenship.”24
C. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 provides aliens that served in the United States
military during times of war a short cut to become naturalized.25 This
short cut is achieved by waiving the standard residency requirements
detailed in § 1427(a) that are otherwise necessary to naturalize.26
Specifically, § 1440(b) provides this exception:

has resided within the State or within the district of the Service in the United States
in which the applicant filed the application for at least three months”).
22
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e) (LexisNexis 2006).
23
Id.
24
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
25
For example, when President George W. Bush issued an executive order that
declared “the war against terrorists of global reach” an “armed conflict” it was done
“solely in order to provide expedited naturalization for aliens and noncitizen
nationals serving in an active-duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States.”
Exec. Order No. 13,269, 67 FR 45,287 (July 8, 2002) (emphasis added).
26
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 813.
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(b) Exceptions. A person filing an application under
subsection (a) of this section shall comply in all other
respects with the requirements of this title, except that-. . . (2) no period of residence or specified period of
physical presence within the United States or any State
or district of the Service in the United States shall be
required;27
This exception is unique to wartime veterans;28 another statute govern
the naturalization of veterans that served during times of peace.29
D. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439
8 U.S.C.S. § 1439 is often viewed as the naturalization statute for
alien veterans serving in times of peace.30 While it does govern
veteran peacetime naturalization,31 it also applies to any alien that has
“served honorably for one year in the military” regardless of whether
that service was during a time of conflict.32 Thus, “[m]any service
members will now be eligible [to naturalize] under both [§ 1439] and
[§ 1440], though their application may only be filed under one
provision.”33
27

8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b) (LexisNexis 2006).
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(a) (requiring that any veteran naturalizing under this
statute must have served during a “period which the President by Executive order
shall designate as a period in which Armed Forces of the United States are or were
engaged in military operations involving armed conflict with a hostile foreign
force”).
29
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439 (LexisNexis 2006).
30
See, e.g., O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (stating that § 1439 “sets out the
naturalization requirements for peacetime veterans”).
31
This Note will follow the lead of the O’Sullivan court and refer to § 1439 as
a “peacetime” naturalization statute for the sake of consistency and for the ease of
the reader.
32
Major Michael Kent Herring, A Soldier's Road to U.S. Citizenship--Is a
Conviction a Speed Bump or a Stop Sign?, Army Law., June 2004, at 20, 23.
33
Id. at n.57.
28
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Like § 1440, § 1439 relaxes the naturalization requirements of
§ 1427 for alien veterans serving in the military.34 This statute,
however, only lessens the residency requirements; it does not do away
with them entirely.35 Significantly, § 1439 also includes an explicit
good moral character provision.36 This provision requires:
(e) Moral character. Any such period or periods of
service under honorable conditions, and good moral
character, attachment to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and favorable
disposition toward the good order and happiness of the
United States, during such service, shall be proved by
duly authenticated copies of the records of the
executive departments having custody of the records of
such service, and such authenticated copies of records
shall be accepted in lieu of compliance with the
provisions of [8 USCS § 1427(a)].37
This requirement has no counterpart in 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440.38
E. 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d)
Federal regulations also affect judicial interpretation of these
naturalization statutes when deference is afforded to the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (“INS”), Citizenship and Immigration
34

Id. at 23-24.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(d) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that an “applicant shall
comply with the [residency] requirements of [§1427], if the termination of such
service has been more than six months preceding the date of filing the application for
naturalization, except that such service within five years immediately preceding the
date of filing such application shall be considered as residence and physical presence
within the United States”).
36
8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e).
37
Id.
38
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 contains only three sections: “(a) Requirements”; “(b)
Exceptions”; and (c) a revocation of citizenship provision.
35
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Services (“CIS”), or other administrative agencies.39 “Because
Congress did not specify the time period during which a qualifying
noncitizen veteran should demonstrate good moral character, the [INS]
promulgated a regulation” to answer that question.40 Specifically, that
regulation states that an applicant:
(d) Has been, for at least one year prior to filing the
application for naturalization, and continues to be, of
good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and favorably
disposed toward the good order and happiness of the
United States;41
II. CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Although the question of whether § 1440 has an implied good
moral character requirement is an issue of first impression, litigation
surrounding this requirement is not new.42 But courts often possess a
mechanism to answer difficult questions of statutory interpretation:
deference to the administrative agency that is responsible for enforcing
the naturalization statutes.43 This deference, known as Chevron
39

See, e.g., Boatswain v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 413, 416-17 (2d Cir. 2005);
Lopez v. Henley, 416 F.3d 455, 457-58 (5th Cir. 2005); Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d
189, 197-98 (2d Cir. 2003).
40
Santamaria-Ames v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 104 F.3d 1127,
1129 (9th Cir. 1996).
41
8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d) (LEXIS 2006).
42
See, e.g., Petitions for Naturalization of F—G-- & E—E—G--, 137 F. Supp.
782 (D.N.Y. 1956) (denying Petitioners’ naturalization because they could not show
good moral character as a result of committing adultery during the “five years
preceding the filing of their petitions.”); In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (D.
Or. 1975) (holding that homosexuality, while not “conform[ing] to the preferences of
the majority” does not preclude a showing of good moral character).
43
See I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 416 (1999) (stating “that
judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the
immigration context”); but see Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004)
(stating that “[s]ince the Board hasn’t done anything to particularize the meaning of
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deference, becomes available when a court is faced with interpreting
an ambiguous statute.44 In that instance, a court cannot “simply impose
its own construction . . . ,” but must inquire as to whether the
administrating agency has promulgated a relevant interpretation of the
statute at issue.45 If an administrative interpretation exists, then the
court must determine if that construction of the statute is reasonable.46
If it is, then Chevron deference applies and the court can rely upon the
agency interpretation.47
There are circumstances, however, when reliance on Chevron
deference is inappropriate.48 For example, if there are certain
substantive issues present, such as strong constitutional claims49 or
because of the procedural context of the case generally.50 In
O’Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit correctly decided not to defer to CIS,
because the judicial review of a claim for citizenship must be made de

‘crime involving moral turpitude,’ giving Chevron deference to its determination of
that meaning has no practical significance”).
44
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
E.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 914-15 (2006) (explaining that
“[d]eference in accordance with Chevron, however, is warranted only ‘when it
appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’” (citing United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218, 226-227 (2001)).
49
Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (acknowledging
“that the canon of constitutional avoidance can trump Chevron”); see Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (holding that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the
intent of Congress”).
50
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1421(c) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that a review of a
denial of citizenship “shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of
fact and conclusions of law”).
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novo.51 Because the court could not use Chevron deference to defer to
CIS’s interpretation of the naturalization statutes, it follows that it is
improper for the court to rely on case law where such deference was
given.52
However, arguably because of a lack of case law on this issue, the
court did consider cases from other circuits where Chevron deference
was given to the CIS (or INS) interpretation of the good moral
character requirement.53 In fact, none of the cases to which the court
cites addresses whether “§ 1440 entirely excuses qualifying aliens
from the good moral character requirement” in a way that is on point
with the present case.54 To its credit, the court does not specifically
cite to any of these cases when it gives its holding, but it uses them as
a backdrop to support the new rule it established in the Seventh
Circuit.55
III. BACKGROUND ON O’SULLIVAN
When he was twelve, Daniel O’Sullivan moved from Jamaica to
the United States.56 After graduating from high school, O’Sullivan
51

O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d
809, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2006) (relying on 8 U.S.C.S. § 1421(c) that states a review of a
denial of citizenship “shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of
fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a
hearing de novo on the application”); see, e.g., Adiemereonwu v. Gonzales, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9681, at *11 (D. Tex. 2005) (explaining that “if CIS denies a
naturalization application -- and that denial has been confirmed after an
administrative appeal, consisting of a hearing before a senior naturalization officer -the rejected applicant may seek de novo judicial review of the denial in the United
States district court for the district in which he resides”).
52
See O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812, n.2 (criticizing Boatswain v. Gonzales, 414
F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 2005) for relying on Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003)
and “the petitioner’s concession that the statutory interpretation upheld as reasonable
in Nolan was binding in this new [de novo] context”).
53
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 814-15.
54
Id. at 812.
55
Id. at 812-16.
56
Id. at 810.
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entered active military duty in September 1976 where he “served in
the Marines and the Air Force during the Vietnam hostilities and was
honorably discharged from the military in December 1981.”57 After
leaving the military O’Sullivan “had children, was consistently
employed, and paid taxes.”58 However, in August, 2000, he was
convicted of the aggravated felony of being “party to the crime of
manufacture or delivery of less than five grams of cocaine.”59 After
serving his sentence in Wisconsin state prison, O’Sullivan “was
immediately transferred to the custody of the Department of
Homeland Security which had initiated removal proceedings against
him while he was incarcerated.”60 In the midst of the removal
proceedings, O’Sullivan filed a petition to become a naturalized
citizen under 8 U.S.C. § 1440.61 However, his petition was denied
because of an inability to satisfy the good moral character requirement
based on his aggravated felony conviction.62 O’Sullivan appealed, but
was denied by CIS, and subsequently denied by a federal district court
under the same rationale.63
Before the Seventh Circuit, O’Sullivan argued that the good moral
character requirement in § 1427(a) refers only to the specific time
periods of mandatory residence mentioned in § 1427(a)(1)-(2).64
Because § 1440(b) removes any obligation to satisfy that residency
requirement, there is no time period to which the good moral character
requirement could possibly attach.65 Consequently, O’Sullivan
57

O'Sullivan v. United States Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 372 F. Supp.
2d 1097, 1098 (D. Ill. 2005)
58
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 810.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 810-11.
61
Id. at 811.
62
Id.; see 8 USCS § 1101 (f) (8) (LexisNexis 2006) (barring anyone “who at
any time has been convicted of an aggravated felony” from making a showing of
good moral character).
63
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 811.
64
Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *2, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 052943, (7th Cir. October 28, 2005), 2005 WL 3738527.
65
Id.
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maintains that under a plain reading of § 1440, aliens that qualify for
naturalization under this section need not make a showing of good
moral character.66
O’Sullivan supported this interpretation by comparing and
contrasting the two different statutes under which veterans may
naturalize, § 1439 and § 1440.67 As stated in Section II, § 1439 relaxes
the naturalization requirements of § 1427 for those veterans of the
military in times of peace, but nonetheless explicitly includes a good
moral character requirement.68 A requirement for which there is no
equivalent in § 1440.69 O'Sullivan urged the court “to find that the
express mention of a moral character requirement for peacetime
veterans shows that Congress would have expressly required wartime
veterans to prove good moral character, if that was Congress's will.”70
Despite these arguments, on July 6, 2006, a three-judge panel of
the Seventh Circuit issued a unanimous decision affirming “the district
court’s denial of O’Sullivan’s petition for naturalization.”71 This panel,
composed of Chief Judge Flaum, who wrote the opinion, and Judges
Posner and Kanne,72 held that Congress viewed the good moral
character and residency requirements separately and thus held that
even alien war veterans must make a showing of good moral
character.73 The court gave four reasons for its holding.74 First the
court found that good moral character was not a subset of the
residency requirements.75 Second, the court found that the plain
language of § 1427(a) required a showing of good moral character
66

Id. at 1.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *4, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 05-2943,
(7th Cir. August 15, 2005), 2005 WL 3738525.
68
8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e) (LexisNexis 2006).
69
Compare 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 (LexisNexis 2006), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e).
70
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 814.
71
Id. at 817.
72
Id. at 809.
73
Id. at 815.
74
Id.
75
Id.
67
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“during all periods mentioned” in the statute, regardless of whether the
actual residency requirements applied.76 Third, the court concluded
that the good moral character requirement was intended to be separate
from the residency requirements because it was listed separately in
§ 1427(e).77 The court also explained that the explicit presence of the
good moral character provision in § 1439 is the result of unique
concerns applicable only to naturalizing peacetime veterans.78
Consequently, such a provision is not necessary in § 1440.79 The
inquiry into the court’s reasoning will be further developed below in
Section V.
IV. CASE LAW IN O’SULLIVAN
In O’Sullivan, the Seventh Circuit cites to three “sister circuit”
decisions that all held a showing of good moral character is required in
order to naturalize under § 1440.80 However, these cases, from the
Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals respectively, are
distinguishable from O’Sullivan by either the standard of review or by
the issue presented.81 These cases are briefly considered below for two
purposes: first, to survey the landscape of recent litigation involving
§ 1440 and the good moral character requirement and second, to
illustrate how any reliance on these cases in O’Sullivan is misguided.
A. The Second Circuit: Nolan v. Holmes
The court first considered a Second Circuit case, Nolan v.
Holmes.82 There, Nolan was an alien wartime veteran who was

76

Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
78
Id. at 815-16.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
See id. at 814-15.
82
Id. at 814 (citing Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003)).
77
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convicted of an aggravated felony.83 Once deportation proceedings
began against him, however, he filed a petition for habeas corpus to
terminate these removal actions in order to apply to naturalize under
§ 1440.84 Nolan’s petition was dismissed because the district court
found that the Board of Immigration Appeals correctly held that he
was ineligible to naturalize because of an inability to prove good
moral character.85 Nolan appealed the denial of his petition for habeas
corpus to the Second Circuit, arguing that § 1440 lacks “any specific
statement requiring that an applicant . . . demonstrate good moral
character, or that any particular period of good moral character [be]
maintained.”86
Before deciding the issue, the Second Circuit conducted a detailed
analysis of the statutory language and the legislative history of the
naturalization statutes.87 In its statutory analysis, the court found
particularly persuasive the differences between § 1440 and § 1439;
specifically that § 1439 included an explicit good moral character
requirement which was absent in § 1440.88 The Nolan court noted that:
In light of the fact that both [§ 1440] and [§ 1439] deal
with the naturalization of persons who have served in
the Armed Forces (differentiating between persons who
served in active-duty status during wartime and those
who did not) and the fact that the two sections, enacted
together in 1952, contain some clearly parallel
provisions, it is difficult to infer that the substantive
differences between the sections were not intended.
Thus . . . the appropriateness of interpreting [§ 1440] as
including [a good moral character] requirement for
83

Nolan, 334 F.3d at 190.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *17, Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, No.
01-2608, (2d Cir. November 29, 2001), 2001 WL 34316415.
87
Nolan, 334 F.3d at 195-202.
88
Id. at 197.
84
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naturalization is simply not clear from the face of the
statute.89
Thus, based on its analysis of the plain language of the statutes the
Second Circuit found that “the precise interplay between [§ 1427 and
§ 1440] is hardly clear.”90
Despite this statutory ambiguity, however, the Nolan court found
that the legislative history of the naturalization statues supported a
finding that § 1440 possesses an implied good moral character
requirement.91 The Second Circuit found particularly relevant a 1968
Senate Report on the differences between § 1440 and § 1439.92 That
report described only “three basic differences” between the two
statutes:
The peacetime serviceman must have a minimum of 3
years service, the wartime serviceman has no minimum
required. The peacetime serviceman must petition while
still in the service or within 6 months after its
termination, the wartime serviceman has no limitation.
The peacetime serviceman needs a lawful admission for
permanent residence, while the wartime serviceman can
substitute in its stead his induction or enlistment while
in the United States.93
Notably lacking in this identification of differences is any mention of
the good moral character requirement.94
Because of the ambiguity of the naturalization statutes, the
Second Circuit, through the use of Chevron deference, was able to

89

Id.
Id.
91
Id. at 198-201.
92
Id. at 200-01.
93
S. REP. No. 90-1292, at 4519-20 (1968) (cited by Nolan, 334 F.3d at 201).
94
Nolan, 334 F.3d at 200-01.
90
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defer to the INS interpretation of § 1440.95 And the INS interpretation
of § 1440 is that alien war veterans are required to show good moral
character.96 Thus, Nolan was required to show good moral character in
order to naturalize.97 However, because the Nolan court deferred to the
INS in reaching its holding, it is improper for the O’Sullivan court to
rely upon Nolan when the issue before it must be reviewed de novo.98
B. The Fifth Circuit: Lopez v. Henley
A second case to which the Seventh Circuit cited was Lopez v.
Henley, a Fifth Circuit case that, like Nolan v. Holmes, utilized
Chevron deference.99 Also similar to Nolan, the issue before the Fifth
Circuit arose as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to appeal a
deportation order.100 In a short opinion, the Fifth Circuit found the
statutes ambiguous and relied on Nolan to find the INS interpretation
reasonable.101 Specifically, the Lopez court cited a long passage from
Nolan and agreed that:
Notwithstanding Congress's desire to reward aliens who
have served the United States in its Armed Forces, it
hardly seems unreasonable for the INS to have inferred
95

Id. at 198.
8 C.F.R. § 329.2(d) (LexisNexis 2006).
97
Nolan, 334 F.3d at 195.
98
The procedural posture in O’Sullivan precludes the use of Chevron
deference. O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d
809, 811-12 (7th Cir. 2006); compare Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (permitting a court to defer to an
administrative agency when a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation is
reasonable), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1421(c) (stating that a review of a denial of
citizenship “shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and
conclusions of law”).
99
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 814 (citing Lopez v. Henley, 416 F.3d 455 (5th Cir.
2005)).
100
Lopez, 416 F.3d 456.
101
Id. at 457-58.
96
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that Congress would not have intended to single out
persons trained and/or experienced in physical
confrontations for elimination of the requirement of
good moral character.102
Because of Chevron deference to the INS, the Fifth Circuit
required a showing of good moral character by aliens seeking to
naturalize under § 1440.103 Accordingly, because of the exercise of
Chevron deference, and just as in Nolan, any reliance by the Seventh
Circuit on Lopez is improper.104
C. The Ninth Circuit: Santamaria-Ames v. INS
The only case that the O’Sullivan court cited to that did not rely
on Chevron deference was Santamaria-Ames v. INS.105 Procedurally,
Santamaria-Ames is remarkably similar to O’Sullivan.106 SantamariaAmes was born in Peru and entered into the United States Army in
1974.107 However, after three Article 15 violations and fifteen
counseling sessions for disciplinary violations in his first nine months
of active duty, Santamaria-Ames was honorably discharged from the
Army due to unsuitability.108 His civilian life was similarly
unsuccessful.109 By 1989, Santamaria-Ames had accumulated “twenty
arrests, five felony convictions and twelve misdemeanor
convictions.”110 In 1981 deportation proceedings began against him,
102

Id. at 458; Nolan, 334 F.3d at 198.
Lopez, 416 F.3d at 458.
104
See supra note 98.
105
O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d
809, 814 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Santamaria-Ames v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 104 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1996)).
106
Both cases arose from a denied naturalization petition. See O’Sullivan, 453
F.3d at 811; Santamaria-Ames, 104 F.3d at 1130.
107
Santamaria-Ames, 104 F.3d at 1129.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
103
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but, after a series of rejected appeals for a waiver of deportability,
Santamaria-Ames filed to become a naturalized citizen in 1992.111
However, before the Ninth Circuit, Santamaria-Ames did not
claim that alien war veterans were exempt from showing good moral
character.112 Instead, he argued that the “INS is precluded from
examining character issues predating the . . . one year period” before
his naturalization application to determine if he meets the “good moral
character” requirement.113 The Ninth Circuit concluded that conduct
occurring previous to the one year period before filing could be
considered in the naturalization application and the denial of
Santamaria-Ames’ application for citizenship was upheld.114
Santamaria-Ames does not elucidate any answers for the Seventh
Circuit. These two cases are distinguishable because Santamaria-Ames
essentially conceded the primary assertion at issue in O’Sullivan.115
Thus, it would be disingenuous for the O’Sullivan court to take an
unchallenged assumption from Santamaria-Ames (i.e. that alien war
veterans must show good moral character in order to naturalize) and
use it as precedent to support a holding where that assumption is being
challenged.
V. ERRORS IN THE O’SULLIVAN ANALYSIS
It is not clear how much the Seventh Circuit actually relied upon
the circuit cases it cited in O’Sullivan.116 Ultimately, however, the

111

Id. at 1130.
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1131.
115
Id. at 1130; O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv.,
453 F.3d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that Santamaria-Ames “did not
claim, as O’Sullivan does, that the good moral character requirement is waived for
wartime veterans”).
116
While the court announces its holding with the introduction, “[l]ike our
sister circuits,” it declined to cite to the cases it previously mentioned in any of its
actual analysis. O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
112
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court seemed to base its holding on four arguments.117 First, that good
moral character is not a subset of the residency requirements.118
Second, the court found that the language of § 1427(a) requires that, in
order to become a naturalized citizen, alien wartime veterans must
show they are of good moral character “during all periods mentioned
in the subsection” including the present.119 Third, the court found that
§ 1427(e) indicated that Congress viewed residency requirements
different from the “good moral character” requirements, because they
were listed separately in that statute.120 Finally, the court explained
that “[a]lthough § 1439 explicitly discusses good moral character, it
does so only in contexts that are relevant only to peacetime
veterans.”121 Therefore the absence of this phrase in § 1440 could not
support the inference that good moral character does not need to be
shown by the wartime alien veteran.122
A. First Argument: Good Moral Character is not a Subset of the
Residency Requirement
The Seventh Circuit first supports its holding that aliens who
naturalize under § 1440 are required to show good moral character by
declining to “interpret the good moral character requirement as a
subset of the residency requirement.”123 Unfortunately, little further
analysis accompanies this declaration.124 The court merely adds that
the good moral character requirement does not disappear simply
“because it is found in a subsection with the heading ‘residence.’”125

117

Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 815.
119
Id. (emphasis in original).
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
118
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This explanation is not only counterintuitive, but contrary to
established principles of statutory interpretation: a subset is not
independent of the larger section in which it rests.126
Principles of statutory construction do allow a statute’s structure
to inform its text,127 but the Seventh Circuit redefined the structure of
§ 1427(a) in order to change the meaning of the text by holding that
§ 1427(a)(3) is not a subset of § 1427.128 This redefinition transforms
the good moral character requirement from being the third prong of a
three element test129 to an independent test in § 1440
naturalizations.130 However, this transformation runs contrary to the
“law of statutory construction that, absent ambiguity or irrational
result, the literal language of the statute controls.”131 Section 1427(a)
is not confusing or ambiguous: it is a subsection132 entitled “residence”
and under which Congress placed three subsets,133 one of which is the
126

C.f. R. A. V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 401 (1992) (White, Blackmun,
O’Conner, JJ, concurring) (“It is inconsistent to hold that the government may
proscribe an entire category of speech because the content of that speech is evil, but
that the government may not treat a subset of that category differently without
violating the First Amendment; the content of the subset is by definition worthless
and undeserving of constitutional protection.”)
127
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2620
(2005) (stating that because “[o]rdinary principles of statutory construction
apply….we must examine the statute’s text in light of context, structure, and related
statutory provisions); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 553 (2002) (interpreting
a criminal statute based upon its structure).
128
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
129
NORMAN J. SINGER, SOUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, vol. 1A,
§ 21.14, 179, (West Group, 2002) (stating that where “it is the legislative intent that
all of the requirements must be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the
conjunctive ‘and’ should be used”).
130
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
131
Edwards v. Valdez, 789 F.2d 1477, 1481 (10th Cir. 1986).
132
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (LexisNexis 2006) is a subsection of 8 U.S.C.S.
§ 1427. See Miram-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/subsection
(defining a subsection as “a subdivision or a subordinate division of a section”).
133
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) is a subset of 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a). See MiramWebster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/subset (defining a subset as “a set
each of whose elements is an element of an inclusive set”).
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good moral character requirement.134 In the face of plain language, it
is simply not in the power of the court to emasculate Congressional
legislation by redefining statutory structure.135
B. Second Argument: Good Moral Character Must be Shown
“during all periods mentioned in the subsection”
Second, the court concludes that § 1427(a) requires that the good
moral character requirement must be shown “during all periods
mentioned in the subsection.”136 The court finds it noteworthy that this
language was selected by Congress as opposed to language that would
mandate a showing of good moral character “during the period of time
an alien is required to have lived in the United States before
naturalizing.”137 From this, the court insists that because the five year
period is still “mentioned” in § 1427(a) than “good moral character”
must be shown even though there is no residency requirement to
which it can attach.138 Additionally, the court finds that § 1427(a)
requires an alien to “show that he is still of good moral character” – a
requirement that is not conditioned upon residence.139
First, the court misquotes § 1427(a)(3) as stating that good moral
character must be shown “during all periods mentioned in the
subsection.”140 Rather § 1427(a)(3) properly states that “during all the
periods referred to in this subsection [the alien] has been and still is a

134

8 U.S.C.S. § 1427.
See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (explaining
that when “the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to
enforce it according to its terms’”) (citing Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
485 (1917)).
136
O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d
809, 815 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 USCS § 1427(a)) (emphasis in original).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. (emphasis supplied).
140
Compare O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815, with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3)
(LexisNexis 2006).
135
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person of good moral character.”141 This is a meaningful and
significant difference. The word “mention” is defined as “citing or
calling attention to someone or something especially in a casual or
incidental manner.”142 Consequently, under the word “mentioned,” no
connection is necessary between good moral character and residency
in order to make the good moral character element applicable.143 The
court’s misquotation creates the false impression that § 1427(a)(1) and
(2) are not intended to interact with § 1427(a)(3); but the tenuous
relationship between these elements is something the court’s analysis
creates, and then exploits.144
Thus, the Seventh Circuit is essentially presenting a strawman
argument, because under the word “referred,” a relationship between
good moral character and residency is established.145 The word “refer”
is defined as “to have relation or connection” or “to direct attention
usually by clear and specific mention.”146 By using “referred” instead
of “mentioned,” Congress is specifically limiting the application of the
good moral character requirement to that time period indicated by the
residency requirements.147
This interpretation is not only substantiated by the plain language
of the statute, but also by the structure of § 1427(a).148 As stated
above, the good moral character requirement is, in fact, a subset of a
subsection titled “residence.”149 Therefore, it is logical to conclude
141

8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a).
See Miram-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/mention
(emphasis supplied).
143
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
144
Id.
145
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a).
146
Miram-Webster Online, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/refer (emphasis
supplied).
147
Marlowe v. Bottarelli, 938 F.2d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that courts
should “presume that legislatures and agencies mean what they say . . . the ‘plain
language’ of a statute or regulation will be the best indicator of the enacting body’s
will”).
148
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a).
149
See supra note 134.
142
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that good moral character has a relationship to residency.150 Moreover,
the nature of this relationship conditions the relevancy of § 1427(a)(3)
on the existence of § 1427(a)(1) and (2)151 such that if the residency
requirements represent a time frame of zero152 then there is no time
period to which the good moral character requirement can refer.153
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that the “still is” portion
of § 1427(a)(3) requires aliens to show good moral character
regardless of whether the preceding residency requirements apply154
inherently presumes that Congress is grammatically incompetent. As
the Second Circuit acknowledged, albeit inconclusively, in Nolan,
“linguistic purists could argue that the precise phrase used in
[§ 1427(a)] -- ‘still is . . . of good moral character’ -- connotes
continuity, which logically cannot be shown if there is no relevant
prior period.”155 Congress could have simply switched the word
“still”156 with “presently” and in that manner clearly communicated
that the good moral character requirement is not limited to the periods
of residency expressed in § 1427(a)(1)-(2). However, Congress chose
to use “still.”157 Accordingly, the plain language of § 1427(a)(3) has a
specific meaning that, contrary to the Seventh Circuit, ties good moral
150

Id.
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (stating that a naturalizing alien must show good
moral character “during all the periods referred to in this subsection”).
152
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006).
153
Reply Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *2, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No.
05-2943, (7th Cir. October 28, 2005), 2005 WL 3738527 (questioning “how a good
moral character requirement that is explicitly tied to a period can still exist when the
period requirement is taken away”); see Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, 197 (2d
Cir. 2003) (recognizing the possibility that § 1440 “was not intended to compel any
showing [of good moral character] that another INA section requires in connection
with a period of residence”).
154
O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d
809, 815 (7th Cir. 2006).
155
Nolan, 334 F.3d at 197.
156
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/still
(follow “still[3adverb]”) (defining still as “a function word to indicate the
continuance of an action or condition”).
157
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a)(3) (LexisNexis 2006).
151
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character to the residency requirements.158 Therefore, if the alien
naturalizing under § 1440 is exempted from both of the residency
requirements in § 1427 then there is nothing to which the good moral
character requirement can refer, including the continuous, “still is,”
requirement of § 1427(a)(3).159
C. Third Argument: § 1427(e) Reveals Congress Views Good Moral
Character and Residency as Distinct Requirements
The court’s third argument is that because § 1427(e) separates the
good moral character requirement from “other qualifications for
citizenship,”160 including the residency requirements, this indicates
that Congress “viewed the two requirements as distinct.”161 However,
the Seventh Circuit neglects to explain the implication of this
distinction.162 While there is no doubt that residency requirements are
different from a requirement to show good moral character,163 the
question in O’Sullivan is how these two different requirements are
intended to interact with each other.164
Unfortunately, § 1427(e) is unable to answer this question because
it relates to a different matter entirely.165 This subsection of § 1427 is
158

8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a); O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(b) (LexisNexis 2006); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427.
160
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e).
161
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
162
Id.
163
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a) (listing good moral character and residence
as two separate requirements).
164
Compare Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, at *7, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No.
05-2943, (7th Cir. August 15, 2005), 2005 WL 3738525 (arguing that “a showing of
good moral character need only be made for required periods of residency”), with
Response of Respondent-Appellee, at *10, O'Sullivan, 453 F.3d 809, No. 05-2943,
(7th Cir. October 14, 2005), 2005 WL 3738526 (acknowledging that in § 1440
“Congress clearly recognized . . . that some of the general requirements, such as
residency, may be waived[, b]ut there is no indication from the text of the statutes
that Congress intended to waive a requirement of good moral character for
naturalization purposes”).
165
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e).
159
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solely concerned with the ability of the Attorney General to take into
consideration issues of good moral character and residence beyond the
scope of the five year period given in § 1427(a)(1).166 Thus, while
§ 1427(e) identifies good moral character and residence as separate
requirements, such a distinction sheds no light upon the way these two
requirements interact in § 1427(a).167
D. Fourth Argument: Distinguishing Between § 1439 and § 1440
Finally, the Seventh Circuit erred when it neglected to appreciate
the significance of the presence of the good moral character
requirement in § 1439 and the absence of this or similar requirement in
§ 1440.168 Instead of taking this plain difference at its face, the
O’Sullivan court relegated this crucial dissimilarity in the statutes to a
difference in the time frames under which veterans may naturalize.169
According to the court, the purpose for explicitly mentioning the good
moral character requirement in the context of § 1439 is to allow
peacetime veterans to utilize their military records to meet the
requirements of § 1427(a).170 The court explains this is necessary
because aliens naturalizing under § 1439 must do so no later than six
months after being honorably discharged and therefore may need to
166

See Santamaria-Ames v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 104 F.3d
1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that “the pertinent inquiry is whether the
petitioner is presently of good moral character and has demonstrated good moral
character [during the statutory period] . . . [but] [c]riminal conduct and other
behavior prior to [this] period may be examined”); Yuen Jung v. Barber, 184 F.2d
491, 495 (9th Cir. 1950) (holding that the statutory five year period is the only
material determiner of good moral character, but prior periods are “circumstantially
relevant as bearing upon petitioner’s character”).
167
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(a).
168
O’Sullivan v. United States Citizenship and Immigration Serv., 453 F.3d
809, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2006); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e); 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440.
169
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (explaining that “[u]nlike wartime veterans,
peacetime veterans must serve in the military one full year and apply within six
months of discharge, or while still serving in the military”); compare 8 U.S.C.S.
§ 1439(a), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(a).
170
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815.
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rely upon military records to establish good moral character.171 The
court elaborated, that it was not necessary for Congress to include a
similar provision in § 1440, because wartime veterans often have
shorter lengths of service and may apply for naturalization long after
their service has ended.172 Therefore, according to the Seventh Circuit,
“military records could be significantly less helpful in determining
their current moral character. It stands to reason, then, that Congress
would not set hard-and-fast rules on the use of military records as a
means for wartime aliens to prove good moral character.”173
The court’s explanation does not adequately explain this
discrepancy between § 1439 and § 1440 for three reasons. First, while
alien wartime veterans may choose to naturalize long after they leave
military service as the Seventh Circuit suggests,174 they need not do
so.175 In the event that a wartime veteran opted to naturalize
immediately after being discharged or while still in military service,
O’Sullivan requires that soldier to prove good moral character.176 In
such circumstances, the alien wartime veteran has same reliance on
military records to prove good moral character as an alien serving in a
time of peace and naturalizing under § 1439.177 Because the reliance
on recent military records is the same in both scenarios, the Seventh
Circuit’s justification of the presence of the good moral character
provision in § 1439 suggests that Congress should have included a

171

Id.
Id.
173
Id. at 815-16.
174
Id.
175
Alien wartime veterans can apply to naturalize during their military service.
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440(c) (stating that the successful naturalization of a soldier can
be revoked if they are “separated from the service under other than honorable
conditions”).
176
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 816 (holding that aliens naturalizing under § 1440
must satisfy the good moral character provision in § 1427(a)).
177
Cf. O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (explaining that peacetime veterans need
the good moral character provision of § 1439(e) in order to prove good moral
character through recent military records).
172
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similar provision in § 1440.178 Just like aliens who naturalize under
§ 1439, alien wartime veterans naturalizing under § 1440 need a good
moral character provision that allows them to “show good moral
character during their recent service through military records.”179 Yet
no similar, or any, good moral character provision exists in § 1440.180
Thus, there are two explanations as to why § 1439 has a good moral
character provision and § 1440 does not, either Congress overlooked
the possibility that veterans naturalizing under § 1440 might do so
immediately or else the court’s analysis on this provision was
incomplete.181
Second, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis also fails to consider the
relevancy of § 1427(e) on the differences between § 1439 and
§ 1440.182 Section 1427(e) provides that the Attorney General “may
take into consideration as a basis for [determining good moral
character] the applicant’s conduct and acts at any time prior to that
period.183 Accordingly, if an alien naturalizing under § 1440 is subject
to the good moral character requirement in § 1427, then the Attorney
General may find old military records of significant interest to reach a
conclusion concerning an applicant’s good moral character.184 Yet
there is no provision in § 1440 that provides for the use of old military
records to prove good moral character, despite the inclusion of such a
provision in § 1439.185
Finally, nowhere on this issue does the Seventh Circuit in
O’Sullivan cite to an applicable and extensive legislative record.186
178

Id.
Id.
180
See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 (LexisNexis 2006).
181
See supra text accompanying notes 174-80.
182
O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815-16.
183
8 U.S.C.S. § 1427(e).
184
But see O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 815 (explaining that aliens naturalizing
under § 1440 may be far removed from their military service so that their “military
records could be significantly less helpful in determining their current moral
character”) (emphasis supplied).
185
Compare 8 U.S.C.S. § 1439(e) (LexisNexis 2006), with 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440.
186
See O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812-16.
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Unfortunately, however, the lack of citation did not prevent the court
from asserting what are essentially Congressional intent arguments.187
Such analysis is particularly troubling when the court is attempting to
explain and rationalize why one statute contains a clause that a
functionally similar statute does not; especially when both statutes
were “enacted together . . . [and] contain some clearly parallel
provisions.”188 The Supreme Court has made this pillar of statutory
interpretation clear: “[w]e do not lightly assume that Congress has
omitted from its adopted text requirements that it nonetheless intends
to apply, and our reluctance is even greater when Congress has shown
elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a
requirement manifest.”189 This canon of statutory construction is
particularly relevant in O’Sullivan, because of the Seventh Circuit’s
choice to rely solely on the plain language of the statutes to support its
reasoning.190
This critique of the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is further
strengthened by legislation that occurred after the O’Sullivan opinion
was issued.191 Just less than three months after the Seventh Circuit
decided O’Sullivan, a bill was proposed in the Senate that would add a
good moral character requirement to § 1440.192 Entitled the “Soldiers
to Citizens Act,” this bill would amend § 1440 to require an alien
wartime veteran to “demonstrate to the military chain of
command . . . good moral character.”193 This proposal by former
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, serves as an additional indicator that

187

Id. at 815-16 (explaining the reasons why Congress mentions good moral
character in § 1439 but not in § 1440).
188
Nolan v. Holmes, 334 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
189
Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005).
190
See O’Sullivan, 453 F.3d at 812-16.
191
S. 3947, 109th Cong. (2006).
192
Id.
193
Id.
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the plain language of § 1440 does not currently require naturalizing
wartime veterans to prove good moral character.194
CONCLUSION
The O’Sullivan court erred in its holding that alien wartime
veterans need to show good moral character in order to naturalize
under § 1440. The Seventh Circuit not only failed to properly interpret
the plain language of the naturalization statutes, including adequately
explaining why § 1439 included a good moral character provision but
§ 1440 did not, but it also misquoted a relevant part of § 1440 and then
relied upon that misquotation to reach its conclusion. Finally, the court
did not cite to any legislative history, though it presumed to infer
Congressional intent to support an opinion that ran contrary to the
plain language of the relevant statutes. Whether based on policy
preferences or simply out of a desire not to be the first circuit to break
rank on this issue, the O’Sullivan court erred in interpreting § 1427
and § 1440 to require a showing of good moral character from alien
wartime veterans.
While this ruling impacts a great many alien veterans serving in
the armed forces, the effect of this impact is likely to be slight. If
legislation passes that adds an explicit good moral requirement to
§ 1440 then O’Sullivan will not present any adverse consequences to
veterans seeking to naturalize under § 1440. However, until such
legislation passes, it is possible that O’Sullivan will discourage aliens
from serving in the military, because misconstruing the plain language
of § 1440 undermines the certainty and possibility of naturalization.

194

Compare 8 U.S.C.S. § 1440 (LexisNexis 2006), with S. 3947, 109th Cong.

(2006).
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